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Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

Fri, 07 Jul 2023

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1.Exploring Encrypted Keyboards to Defeat Client-Side Scanning in End-to-End Encryption Systems

Authors:Mashari Alatawi, Nitesh Saxena

Abstract: End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) aims to make all messages impossible to read by anyone except you and your intended recipient(s). Many well-known and widely used Instant-Messaging (IM) applications (such as Signal, WhatsApp, and Apple's iMessage) claim to provide E2EE. However, a recent technique called client-side scanning (CSS) makes these E2EE claims grandiose and hollow promises. The CSS is a technology that scans all sending and receiving messages from one end to the other. Some in industry and government now advocate this CSS technology to combat the growth of malicious child pornography, terrorism, and other illicit communication. Even though combating the spread of illegal and morally objectionable content is a laudable effort, it may open further backdoors that impact the user's privacy and security. Therefore, it is not E2EE when there are censorship mechanisms and backdoors in end-to-end encrypted applications. In this paper, we introduce an encrypted keyboard that functions as a system keyboard, enabling users to employ it across all applications on their phones when entering data. By utilizing this encrypted keyboard, users can locally encrypt and decrypt messages, effectively bypassing the CSS system. We first design and implement our encrypted keyboard as a custom keyboard application, and then we evaluate the effectiveness and security of our encrypted keyboard. Our study results show that our encrypted keyboard can successfully encrypt and decrypt all sending and receiving messages through IM applications, and therefore, it can successfully defeat the CSS technology in end-to-end encrypted systems. We also show that our encrypted keyboard can be used to add another layer of E2EE functionality on top of the existing E2EE functionality implemented by many end-to-end encrypted applications.

2.Towards Deep Network Steganography: From Networks to Networks

Authors:Guobiao Li, Sheng Li, Meiling Li, Zhenxing Qian, Xinpeng Zhang

Abstract: With the widespread applications of the deep neural network (DNN), how to covertly transmit the DNN models in public channels brings us the attention, especially for those trained for secret-learning tasks. In this paper, we propose deep network steganography for the covert communication of DNN models. Unlike the existing steganography schemes which focus on the subtle modification of the cover data to accommodate the secrets, our scheme is learning task oriented, where the learning task of the secret DNN model (termed as secret-learning task) is disguised into another ordinary learning task conducted in a stego DNN model (termed as stego-learning task). To this end, we propose a gradient-based filter insertion scheme to insert interference filters into the important positions in the secret DNN model to form a stego DNN model. These positions are then embedded into the stego DNN model using a key by side information hiding. Finally, we activate the interference filters by a partial optimization strategy, such that the generated stego DNN model works on the stego-learning task. We conduct the experiments on both the intra-task steganography and inter-task steganography (i.e., the secret and stego-learning tasks belong to the same and different categories), both of which demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method for covert communication of DNN models.

3.Improving Bitswap Privacy with Forwarding and Source Obfuscation

Authors:Erik Daniel, Marcel Ebert, Florian Tschorsch

Abstract: IPFS is a content-addressed decentralized peer-to-peer data network, using the Bitswap protocol for exchanging data. The data exchange leaks the information to all neighbors, compromising a user's privacy. This paper investigates the suitability of forwarding with source obfuscation techniques for improving the privacy of the Bitswap protocol. The usage of forwarding can add plausible deniability and the source obfuscation provides additional protection against passive observers. First results showed that through trickle-spreading the source prediction could decrease to 40 %, at the cost of an increased content fetching time. However, assuming short distances between content provider and consumer the content fetching time can be faster even with the additional source obfuscation.

4.Random Number Generators and Seeding for Differential Privacy

Authors:Naoise Holohan

Abstract: Differential Privacy (DP) relies on random numbers to preserve privacy, typically utilising Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) as a source of randomness. In order to allow for consistent reproducibility, testing and bug-fixing in DP algorithms and results, it is important to allow for the seeding of the PRNGs used therein. In this work, we examine the landscape of Random Number Generators (RNGs), and the considerations software engineers should make when choosing and seeding a PRNG for DP. We hope it serves as a suitable guide for DP practitioners, and includes many lessons learned when implementing seeding for diffprivlib.

5.From Lemons to Peaches: Improving Security ROI through Security Chaos Engineering

Authors:Kelly Shortridge

Abstract: Traditional information security presents a poor ROI: payoffs only manifest when attacks are successfully prevented. In a reality where attacks are inevitable, subpar returns are therefore inevitable. The emerging paradigm of Security Chaos Engineering offers a more remunerative and reliable ROI by minimizing attack impacts and generating valuable evidence to inform continuous improvement of system design and operation.