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Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

Thu, 22 Jun 2023

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1.Proof of reserves and non-double spends for Chaumian Mints

Authors:Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Perez-Marco

Abstract: E-cash was invented in 1982 by David Chaum as an anonymous cryptographic electronic cash system based on blind signatures. It is not a decentralized form of money as Bitcoin. It requires trust on the server or Mint issuing the e-cash tokens and validating the transactions for preventing double spends. Moreover, the users also need to trust the Mint to not debase the value of e-cash tokens by Minting an uncontrolled number. In particular, this is critical for e-cash tokens representing a note of another asset as a currency, or bitcoin, or another cryptocurrency. Thus it would be suitable to implement a public auditing system providing a proof of reserves that ensures that the Mint is not engaging into a fractional reserve system. In this article we describe how to implement a proof of reserves system for Chaumian Mints. The protocol also provides a proof of non-double spends.

2.On the Construction of Near-MDS Matrices

Authors:Kishan Chand Gupta, Sumit Kumar Pandey, Susanta Samanta

Abstract: The optimal branch number of MDS matrices makes them a preferred choice for designing diffusion layers in many block ciphers and hash functions. However, in lightweight cryptography, Near-MDS (NMDS) matrices with sub-optimal branch numbers offer a better balance between security and efficiency as a diffusion layer, compared to MDS matrices. In this paper, we study NMDS matrices, exploring their construction in both recursive and nonrecursive settings. We provide several theoretical results and explore the hardware efficiency of the construction of NMDS matrices. Additionally, we make comparisons between the results of NMDS and MDS matrices whenever possible. For the recursive approach, we study the DLS matrices and provide some theoretical results on their use. Some of the results are used to restrict the search space of the DLS matrices. We also show that over a field of characteristic 2, any sparse matrix of order $n\geq 4$ with fixed XOR value of 1 cannot be an NMDS when raised to a power of $k\leq n$. Following that, we use the generalized DLS (GDLS) matrices to provide some lightweight recursive NMDS matrices of several orders that perform better than the existing matrices in terms of hardware cost or the number of iterations. For the nonrecursive construction of NMDS matrices, we study various structures, such as circulant and left-circulant matrices, and their generalizations: Toeplitz and Hankel matrices. In addition, we prove that Toeplitz matrices of order $n>4$ cannot be simultaneously NMDS and involutory over a field of characteristic 2. Finally, we use GDLS matrices to provide some lightweight NMDS matrices that can be computed in one clock cycle. The proposed nonrecursive NMDS matrices of orders 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 can be implemented with 24, 50, 65, 96, and 108 XORs over $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, respectively.

3.XACML Extension for Graphs: Flexible Authorization Policy Specification and Datastore-independent Enforcement

Authors:Aya Mohamed, Dagmar Auer, Daniel Hofer, Josef Küng

Abstract: The increasing use of graph-structured data for business- and privacy-critical applications requires sophisticated, flexible and fine-grained authorization and access control. Currently, role-based access control is supported in graph databases, where access to objects is restricted via roles. This does not take special properties of graphs into account such as vertices and edges along the path between a given subject and resource. In previous iterations of our research, we started to design an authorization policy language and access control model, which considers the specification of graph paths and enforces them in the multi-model database ArangoDB. Since this approach is promising to consider graph characteristics in data protection, we improve the language in this work to provide flexible path definitions and specifying edges as protected resources. Furthermore, we introduce a method for a datastore-independent policy enforcement. Besides discussing the latest work in our XACML4G model, which is an extension to the Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), we demonstrate our prototypical implementation with a real case and give an outlook on performance.

4.Decentralized Online Federated G-Network Learning for Lightweight Intrusion Detection

Authors:Mert Nakıp, Baran Can Gül, Erol Gelenbe

Abstract: Cyberattacks are increasingly threatening networked systems, often with the emergence of new types of unknown (zero-day) attacks and the rise of vulnerable devices. While Machine Learning (ML)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been shown to be extremely promising in detecting these attacks, the need to learn large amounts of labelled data often limits the applicability of ML-based IDSs to cybersystems that only have access to private local data. To address this issue, this paper proposes a novel Decentralized and Online Federated Learning Intrusion Detection (DOF-ID) architecture. DOF-ID is a collaborative learning system that allows each IDS used for a cybersystem to learn from experience gained in other cybersystems in addition to its own local data without violating the data privacy of other systems. As the performance evaluation results using public Kitsune and Bot-IoT datasets show, DOF-ID significantly improves the intrusion detection performance in all collaborating nodes simultaneously with acceptable computation time for online learning.

5.Online Self-Supervised Learning in Machine Learning Intrusion Detection for the Internet of Things

Authors:Mert Nakıp, Erol Gelenbe

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel Self-Supervised Intrusion Detection (SSID) framework, which enables a fully online Machine Learning (ML) based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that requires no human intervention or prior off-line learning. The proposed framework analyzes and labels incoming traffic packets based only on the decisions of the IDS itself using an Auto-Associative Deep Random Neural Network, and on an online estimate of its statistically measured trustworthiness. The SSID framework enables IDS to adapt rapidly to time-varying characteristics of the network traffic, and eliminates the need for offline data collection. This approach avoids human errors in data labeling, and human labor and computational costs of model training and data collection. The approach is experimentally evaluated on public datasets and compared with well-known ML models, showing that this SSID framework is very useful and advantageous as an accurate and online learning ML-based IDS for IoT systems.

6.Impacts and Risk of Generative AI Technology on Cyber Defense

Authors:Subash Neupane, Ivan A. Fernandez, Sudip Mittal, Shahram Rahimi

Abstract: Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) has emerged as a powerful technology capable of autonomously producing highly realistic content in various domains, such as text, images, audio, and videos. With its potential for positive applications in creative arts, content generation, virtual assistants, and data synthesis, GenAI has garnered significant attention and adoption. However, the increasing adoption of GenAI raises concerns about its potential misuse for crafting convincing phishing emails, generating disinformation through deepfake videos, and spreading misinformation via authentic-looking social media posts, posing a new set of challenges and risks in the realm of cybersecurity. To combat the threats posed by GenAI, we propose leveraging the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) to understand the lifecycle of cyberattacks, as a foundational model for cyber defense. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the risk areas introduced by the offensive use of GenAI techniques in each phase of the CKC framework. We also analyze the strategies employed by threat actors and examine their utilization throughout different phases of the CKC, highlighting the implications for cyber defense. Additionally, we propose GenAI-enabled defense strategies that are both attack-aware and adaptive. These strategies encompass various techniques such as detection, deception, and adversarial training, among others, aiming to effectively mitigate the risks posed by GenAI-induced cyber threats.