1.Wisdom of the Crowds or Ignorance of the Masses? A data-driven guide to WSB

Authors:Valentina Semenova, Dragos Gorduza, William Wildi, Xiaowen Dong, Stefan Zohren

Abstract: A trite yet fundamental question in economics is: What causes large asset price fluctuations? A tenfold rise in the price of GameStop equity, between the 22nd and 28th of January 2021, demonstrated that herding behaviour among retail investors is an important contributing factor. This paper presents a data-driven guide to the forum that started the hype -- WallStreetBets (WSB). Our initial experiments decompose the forum using a large language topic model and network tools. The topic model describes the evolution of the forum over time and shows the persistence of certain topics (such as the market / S\&P500 discussion), and the sporadic interest in others, such as COVID or crude oil. Network analysis allows us to decompose the landscape of retail investors into clusters based on their posting and discussion habits; several large, correlated asset discussion clusters emerge, surrounded by smaller, niche ones. A second set of experiments assesses the impact that WSB discussions have had on the market. We show that forum activity has a Granger-causal relationship with the returns of several assets, some of which are now commonly classified as `meme stocks', while others have gone under the radar. The paper extracts a set of short-term trade signals from posts and long-term (monthly and weekly) trade signals from forum dynamics, and considers their predictive power at different time horizons. In addition to the analysis, the paper presents the dataset, as well as an interactive dashboard, in order to promote further research.

2.Discretionary Extensions to Unemployment-Insurance Compensation and Some Potential Costs for a McCall Worker

Authors:Rich Ryan

Abstract: Unemployment insurance provides temporary cash benefits to eligible unemployed workers. Benefits are sometimes extended by discretion during economic slumps. In a model that features temporary benefits and sequential job opportunities, a worker's reservation wages are studied when policymakers can make discretionary extensions to benefits. A worker's optimal labor-supply choice is characterized by a sequence of reservation wages that increases with weeks of remaining benefits. The possibility of an extension raises the entire sequence of reservation wages, meaning a worker is more selective when accepting job offers throughout their spell of unemployment. The welfare consequences of misperceiving the probability and length of an extension are investigated. In a numerical example, the costs of misperception are small, which has implications for policymakers considering economic slumps, virus pandemics, extreme heat, and natural disasters.

3.Managers' Choice of Disclosure Complexity

Authors:Jeremy Bertomeu

Abstract: Aghamolla and Smith (2023) make a significant contribution to enhancing our understanding of how managers choose financial reporting complexity. I outline the key assumptions and implications of the theory, and discuss two empirical implications: (1) a U-shaped relationship between complexity and returns, and (2) a negative association between complexity and investor sophistication. However, the robust equilibrium also implies a counterfactual positive market response to complexity. I develop a simplified approach in which simple disclosures indicate positive surprises, and show that this implies greater investor skepticism toward complexity and a positive association between investor sophistication and complexity. More work is needed to understand complexity as an interaction of reporting and economic transactions, rather than solely as a reporting phenomenon.

4.Paths to Influence: How Coordinated Influence Operations Affect the Prominence of Ideas

Authors:Darren L. Linvill, Patrick L. Warren

Abstract: This paper presents four examples of different ways that coordinated influence operations exert pressure on the prominence of ideas on social networks. We argue that these examples illustrate the four archetypical paths to influence: promotion by strengthening, promotion by weakening, demotion by strengthening, and demotion by weakening. We formalize this idea in a stylized economic model of the optimal behavior of the influence operator and derive some predictions about when we should expect each path to be followed. Finally we sketch out how one might go about quantitatively estimating the key parameters of (a variant of) this model and how it applies much more broadly than in the international political influence examples that motivate it.